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      Issue 
Has Hanson failed to show error in the district court’s denial of his motion to 
correct credit for time served? 
 
 
Hanson Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Denial Of His Motion To 
Correct Credit For Time Served 
 
 In 2004, a grand jury indicted Hanson on three counts of sexual abuse of a child 
under the age of 16 years and two counts of failure to report abuse.  (R., pp.6-8.)  
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hanson pled guilty to one count of sexual abuse of a 
child under the age of 16 years, and the state dismissed the remaining charges.  (R., 
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pp.54-55.)  The district court imposed a unified sentence of 15 years, with three years 
fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.70-73.)  Following the period of retained 
jurisdiction, the district court relinquished jurisdiction and granted Hanson 454 days of 
credit for time served.  (R., pp.77-79.)  Hanson filed a timely Rule 35 motion for a 
reduction of sentence, which the district court denied.  (R., pp.85-88, 98-100.)   
More than nine years later, Hanson filed a “Motion for Correction of Sentence Per 
ICR 35(c),” claiming that the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) “incorrectly 
calculated” the “full term expiration” date of his sentence when applying his 454 days of 
credit for time served.  (R., pp.102-04.)  The district court denied the motion, noting that 
Hanson was not challenging the court’s calculation of 454 days of credit for prejudgment 
time served, and that it did not have jurisdiction to correct decisions made by IDOC with 
respect to whether to award Hanson credit for time served while he was on parole.  (R., 
pp.106-08.)  Hanson filed a notice of appeal timely only from the district court’s order 
denying his motion to correct credit for time served.  (R., pp.109-11.)   
Hanson asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to correct credit 
for time served because, he claims, IDOC incorrectly calculated the full term expiration 
date of his sentence when it applied his 454 days of credit for time served.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp.1-2.)  Hanson has failed to show error in the district court’s denial of his motion 
to correct credit for time served.   
“A motion to correct a court’s computation of credit for time served, granted 
pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 18-309 or 19-2603, may be made at any time.”  I.C.R. 
35(c) (emphasis added).  Pursuant to I.C. § 18-309: 
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom 
the judgment was entered shall receive credit in the judgment for any 
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period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was 
for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered.  
The remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement of 
sentence and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal 
means is temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently 
returned thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be 
computed as part of such term.   
 
I.C. § 18-309(1) (emphasis added).   
In its order denying Hanson’s motion to correct IDOC’s calculation of the full term 
expiration date of Hanson’s sentence, the district court properly determined that its 
jurisdiction under Rule 35(c) “is limited to correcting the Court’s own computation of 
credit for time served” and that “Hanson has not argued, much less shown, that the 
Court’s own computation is incorrect.”  (R., p.107.)  The district court continued: 
Moreover, the Court is able to discern from the records attached to 
the motion [see R., p.104] that the Department has not failed to give effect 
to the Court’s award of 454 days of credit for prejudgment incarceration.  
The difference between the full term expiration date as calculated by the 
Department and as calculated by Hanson is almost entirely accounted for 
by an evident parole commission decision that 116 days of the time 
Hanson spent on parole should not be counted against his prison 
sentence.  That decision is within the parole commission’s authority, see 
I.C. § 20-228, and the Court lacks authority to override it. 
 
(R., p.107.)  Indeed, the Idaho Department of Correction Official Time Calculation 
Report – submitted by Hanson in support of his motion to correct credit for time served 
– indicates that, following his commitment to IDOC, Hanson was paroled on at least one 
occasion, and that his parole was later revoked.  (R., p.104.)  As stated by the district 
court, I.C. § 20-228 authorizes the parole commission to exercise discretion to credit 
time spent on parole when calculating the remaining period of confinement after parole 
is revoked.  Specifically, I.C. § 20-228 provides:  “Such person so recommitted … must 
serve out the sentence, and the time during which such prisoner was out on parole shall 
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not be deemed a part thereof, unless the commission, in its discretion, shall determine 
otherwise... .”  Nothing in the record rebuts the presumption that the Commission, in the 
exercise of its statutory discretion, determined that Hanson was not entitled to credit for 
the time he spent on parole prior to being recommitted.  A motion to correct credit for 
time served is not the proper mechanism for addressing IDOC’s calculation of the full 
term expiration date of Hanson’s sentence, particularly where, as here, Hanson is not 
challenging the amount of credit for time served (prejudgment) that the district court 
awarded him.  Rather, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is an appropriate mechanism 
for challenging an alleged impropriety or error in the Department's computation of a 
prisoner's sentence.  Mickelsen v. Idaho State Correctional Instn., 131 Idaho 352, 355, 
955 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Ct. App. 1998).   
Because the district court did not have the authority to alter computations made 
by IDOC, or to grant Hanson credit for time he served on parole after he was committed 
to IDOC custody, the court did not err by denying Hanson’s motion to correct the 
Department’s calculation of the full term expiration date of Hanson’s sentence.  As such, 
Hanson has failed to establish error in the district court’s denial of his motion to correct 





 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
denying Hanson’s motion to correct credit for time served. 
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